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INTRODUCTION
Plea bargains, in which a defendant pleads guilty to a crime in exchange
for a reduced sentence and an opportunity to avoid the uncertainty of a trial,
are increasingly common in the criminal justice system.0 Once a defendant
accepts a plea bargain, the circuits are split on whether or not the plea
inherently waives a defendant’s right to challenge her statute of conviction
upon appeal.2 The United States Supreme Court will soon provide
clarification on this question in Class v. United States.3
The government charged Rodney Class, the petitioner in Class, with
1possession of a firearm+ on the grounds of the Capitol building./ Appearing
pro se, Class pled guilty to the charge in district court.5 Prior to accepting
his plea and 1pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 00+, the district
court informed Class that by pleading guilty he would be 1generally giving
up =his< rights to appeal+, except for his right to challenge the voluntariness
of the plea and the legality of his sentence.6 Class responded that he
understood that he was waiving his appellate rights..
Despite his response to the district court, Class later appealed, claiming
that the statute prohibiting firearms on Capitol grounds was unconstitutional
under the Second Amendment.- The D.C. Circuit Court declined to address
0. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 056, 0.4 924028 9citing Missouri v. Frye, 566
U.S. 033 9240288 9observing that the criminal justice system functions as a 1system of
pleas, not a system of trials,+ and that ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and
ninety-four percent of state convictions result from guilty pleas8.
2. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 02, Class v. United States, -5 U.S.L.W.
3394 924068 9No. 06-/2/8 9noting that 1=s<ome circuits . . . =hold< that a =guilty< plea
inherently waives every underlying constitutional claim except the double jeopardy and
vindictive prosecution claims+% other circuits hold that 1guilty plea=s only< concede=<
factual guilt+ and do not necessarily waive the possibility of raising facial or as-applied
challenges on appeal% and others still only allow facial challenges8.
3. See Class v. United States, No. 05-3405, 2406 U.S. App. LEXIS 02624 at 72
9D.C. Cir. July 5, 24068% Class v. United States, SCOTUS BLOG,
http:55www.scotusblog.com5case-files5cases5class-v-united-states5 9last visited Dec. 2,
240.8 9granting certiorari to decide whether a guilty plea waives a defendant’s right to
challenge her statute of conviction on appeal8.
/. See Class, 2406 U.S. App. LEXIS 02624, at 70 9citing /4 U.S.C. & 504/9e8 as
the basis for Class’s arrest and conviction8.
5. See id. 9noting that Class had previously been represented by court appointed
counsel who was later 1discharged at =Class’s< request+, while a 1Federal Public
Defender served as . . . advisory counsel+8.
6. See id. at 70-2 9detailing the dialogue between Class and the trial judge8.
.. See id. at 72 9implying that the unconditional plea was knowing and intelligent8.
-. See id. 9describing Class’s claims as 1three grounds of constitutional error and a
2
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the merits of Class’ claim.9 Instead, the Court maintained that in only two
situations can an unconditional plea waive a defendant’s right to appeal her
conviction: 908 when she asserts a 1claim that the =lower< court lacked . . .
jurisdiction+, and 928 when she asserts a claim that the state should not have
1haled =her< into court at all+.04 The Court held that because his claim did
not fall into one of those two exceptions, Class had no right to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute.00
This comment argues that the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion was incorrect, and
that the Supreme Court should follow a different approach upon review. Part
II explores the Court’s limited case law addressing the effects of guilty pleas
on challenges to various procedural errors on appeal. Additionally, Part II
discusses the robust jurisprudence concerning the retroactive application of
substantive criminal rules.02
Part III argues that the retroactivity doctrine cautions against holding that
a guilty plea precludes a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of
the statute of her conviction.03 Part III further asserts that the Court’s
substantive due process doctrine prevents arbitrary impositions on protected
conduct, including allowing a guilty plea to bar a defendant from challenging
the constitutionality of the statute of her conviction following a guilty plea.0/
Part III also examines the text of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
governing pleas and contends that the Rule’s ambiguity allows for the
possibility that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s right to pursue
constitutional challenges to her statute of conviction on appeal.05
further claim of statutory error+8.
9. See id. 9asserting that Class’s claims were not properly before the court8.
04. See id. 9citing United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 3./ F.3d 033., 03/0 9D.C. Cir.
244/8 9noting that Class’s claim does not fall into either of the two categories of claims88.
00. See id. 9noting that Class also did not reserve any rights to appeal in his plea, so
he has no right to review8.
02. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 036 S. Ct. .0-, .3. 924068 9applying the
rule prohibiting mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles retroactively8%
Teague v. Lane, /-9 U.S. 2--, 306 909-98 9declining to apply new peremptory challenge
rules retroactively8% Mackey v. United States, /40 U.S. 66., 66. 909.08 9Harlan, J.,
dissent8 9arguing that new protections against self-incrimination should apply
retroactively8.
03. See infra Part III9A8 9applying retroactivity doctrine to argue that allowing a
guilty plea to waive an appellate challenge to the constitutionality of one’s statute of
conviction would allow the state to criminalize protected conduct8.
0/. See infra Part III9B8 9arguing that allowing guilty pleas to waive constitutional
challenges to one’s statute of conviction would be a judicially imposed arbitrary
infringement on protected conduct8.
05. See infra Part III9C8 9analyzing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 00 and
3
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Part IV recommends, in lieu of the preferred outcome in Class, that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 00 be amended to clarify that
constitutional challenges to one’s statute of conviction are not inherently
waived by a guilty plea.06 Finally, Part V reiterates the relevance of the
Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence and concludes that those cases provide
the most reasonable framework for determining how guilty pleas should
affect a defendant’s right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of
her conviction on appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Retroactive Application of New Substantive Constitutional Rules.
One question that often arises in criminal procedure is when to apply new
constitutional rules to similar cases that have been litigated under old
constitutional rules.0. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Mackey outlines the steps
a court should take in answering this question.0- When the new rule is
procedural, the Court must apply the law as it existed 1at the time =the<
conviction became final.+09 Justice Harlan rests this conclusion on the fact
that the state has a significant interest in establishing the finality of criminal
cases.24 However, Justice Harlan notes that when substantive due process
rules are at issue, the weight given to the state’s interest in finality shifts
significantly.20
The United States Supreme Court defines substantive due process rules as
those that determine what kind of conduct can be penalized and how the
arguing that its text supports the desired holding in Class8.
06. See infra Part IV 9arguing for an update to Rule 00 to clarify which appellate
rights a guilty plea waives8.
0.. See Mackey v. United States, /40 U.S. 6.5, 6.5 909.08 9Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part8 9noting that the same question of the applicability of new
rules to cases that have already been finalized is at issue in the three companion cases
that the opinion addresses8.
0-. See Teague v. Lane, /-9 U.S. 2--, 346-4. 909-98 9citing Mackey, /40 U.S. at
6-2 9Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part8 9explaining that 1it is
*sounder . . . to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final’+88.
09. See Mackey, /40U.S. at 6----9 9Harlan, J., dissenting8 9assuming the procedures
used to convict someone are fair8.
24. See id. at 692-93 9explaining that states and litigants have an interest in obtaining
final resolutions8.
20. See id. at 692 9defining procedural due process rules as those that govern how
valid proscriptions on behavior should be enforced and noting that substantive due
process rules should 1be placed on a different footing+8.
4
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government can go about punishing that conduct.22 The line between
procedural and substantive due process rules is often blurry, but procedural
rules are distinguished from substantive rules in that, when misapplied or
fundamentally unfair, procedural rules may still result in an accurate
conviction, while a substantive rule prevents a state from criminalizing
certain conduct.23 Examples of these substantive rules include those that
prevent the government from criminalizing flag burning, distribution of
contraception, abortion, and interracial marriage.2/ When substantive due
process rules are at issue, the state’s interest in finality is contrary to the
defendant’s interest in being free from punishment.25 The Court condemns
punishments that are in violation of substantive rules in the strongest sense.26
Acknowledging that states generally do have a substantial interest in finality,
the Court finds this interest is rendered irrelevant when the state has no
power to proscribe conduct in the first place.2.
The Court has attempted to strike a balance between the two concerns of
finality and whether the punishment imposed is valid under the
22. Compare Mackey, /40 U.S. at 692 9Harlan, J., dissenting8 91rules . . . that
place . . . certain kinds of . . . private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe+8 with Penry v. Lynaugh, /92 U.S. 342, 334 909-98
91rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of
their status or offense+8.
23. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 036 S. Ct. .0-, .34 924068 9distinguishing
procedural rules as governing the manner in which the defendant’s culpability is
determined from substantive rules as controlling the limits of the punitive powers of the
state8.
2/. See Welch v. United States, 036 S. Ct. 025., 02.6 924068 9citing Mackey, /40
U.S. at 692, n.. 9Harlan, J., dissenting88 9expounding on Justice Harlan’s
substantive5procedural distinction8% see also Texas v. Johnson, /90 U.S. 39. 909-98
9striking down a law criminalizing flag burning8% Roe v. Wade, /04 U.S. 003 909.38
9striking down an abortion prohibition8% Loving v. Virginia, 3-- U.S. 0 9096.8 9holding
that states cannot criminalize interracial marriage8% Griswold v. Connecticut, 3-0 U.S.
/.9 909658 9holding that a law criminalizing the distribution of contraceptives was
unconstitutional8. But cf. CROWLEY, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. ., art. II, & .-5.9a8
924038 9criminalizing wearing 1saggy+ pants, potentially encroaching on the First
Amendment rights to free speech and expression8.
25. See Mackey, /40 U.S. at 693 9Harlan, J., dissenting8 9arguing that the state’s
finality interest should yield when a new rule places certain conduct beyond the state’s
authority to proscribe8.
26. See, e.g., id. 9finding no use in allowing the 1process to rest at a point where it
ought properly never to repose+8.
2.. See Montgomery, 036 U.S. at .32 9asserting the state’s finality interest is
irrelevant when the state cannot impose a punishment 1that the Constitution deprives the
state of the power to impose+8.
5
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Constitution.2- Though the state’s finality interest supersedes the
defendant’s interests when the new rule affects the procedures used to obtain
a conviction, the balance shifts significantly when the rule redefines the
scope of conduct the state may proscribe.29 The risk is not that the conviction
occurred under procedural rules that no longer reflect the state of
constitutional law, but rather that the defendant will be punished for conduct
that is not criminal.34 Thus, the state’s finality interest is entitled to the least
deference, and the defendant’s interest in being free from punishment is most
prominent.30
B. Guilty Pleas and the State’s Power to Bring Charges
In determining whether the state is authorized to prosecute a defendant for
a particular crime, the Court’s retroactivity doctrine parallels its holdings on
the effects of a guilty plea on a defendant’s rights on appeal.32 In this context,
the Court explores the state’s power to prosecute a defendant for a particular
action.33 The two cases in which the Court directly addresses how the state’s
power to prosecute is affected by a guilty plea are Blackledge v. Perry and
Menna v. New York.3/
In Blackledge, the defendant pled not guilty to a misdemeanor assault
2-. See, e.g., Welch, 036 S. Ct. at 0266 9describing the balancing test courts must
perform when evaluating whether retroactivity will apply to an unconstitutionally vague
statute8.
29. See id. 9discussing how the nature of a new rule effects the rule’s weight in the
balancing test8.
34. See id. 9analogizing the differences between the outcomes when a court finds the
new rule procedural or substantive8.
30. See id. 9explaining how the balance shifts from the state’s interest in finality to
the defendant’s liberty interest when a substantive rule is at issue8.
32. See generally Brief for Petitioner at 29, Class v. United States, -5 U.S.L.W. 3394
924068 9No. 06-/2/8 9noting that 1case law supports a holding that a guilty plea does not
inherently waive a defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the statute of
conviction+8.
33. See Blackledge v. Perry, /.0U.S. 20, 34 909./8 9holding that a state did not have
the power to vindictively charge a defendant with a felony, and bring him into court, just
because the defendant appealed a misdemeanor conviction for the same crime8% Menna
v. New York, /23 U.S. 60 909.58 9per curiam8 9holding that where a state is
constitutionally 1precluded . . . from haling a defendant into court on a charge,+ the
conviction must be set aside notwithstanding a guilty plea8.
3/. See Blackledge, /0. U.S. at 20 9holding that the defendant’s guilty plea did not
bar him from raising issues of prosecutorial vindictiveness on appeal8% Menna, /23 U.S.
at 60 9per curiam8 9holding that a guilty plea does not waive a claim that the state lacks
constitutional authority to prosecute the defendant8.
6
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charge, was convicted, and then appealed his conviction.35 After filing his
appeal, the prosecutor charged the defendant with a felony for the same
conduct of which his first conviction arose.36 Since he already had one
conviction for that assault, the defendant pled guilty to the felony.3. The
defendant later brought a claim asserting that the felony charge was a
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.3- The Court held that even though
a guilty plea precludes claims relating to the deprivation of constitutionally
protected pretrial rights, those limitations do not apply when the issue
concerns the power of the state to hale a defendant into court.39 The Court
emphasized the vindictive nature of the second charge as a defect that could
not be cured by a procedural rule or safeguard because the denial of due
process occurred when the state initiated proceedings against him and tainted
the court proceedings from the start./4 The problem with the State’s second
charge was not that it failed to comply with the appropriate procedural rules,
but that the state attempted to bring charges that were constitutionally
prohibited./0
Blackledge laid the foundation for Menna, in which the Court held that a
guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from bringing a double jeopardy
claim on appeal./2 In addition to affirming the principles announced in
Blackledge, Menna introduced the element of factual guilt into the Court’s
analysis of the relevance of guilty pleas in determining what claims can be
brought on appeal./3 The Court notes that a guilty plea only establishes
35. See Blackledge, /0. U.S. at 22 9noting that the defendant’s right to appeal under
state statute is not contested8.
36. See id. at 23 9describing the defendant’s double jeopardy claim8.
3.. See id. at 23 n.2 9explaining why the defendant pled guilty8.
3-. See id. 9noting that the defendant also claimed that his due process rights had
been violated8.
39. See id. at 29-34 9explaining that complaints about 1antecedent constitutional
violations+ involving a plea bargain are limited to voluntariness of the plea8.
/4. See Blackledge, /0. U.S. at 34-30 9holding that the 1very initiation of
proceedings against =the defendant< . . . thus operated to deny him due process of law+8.
/0. See id. at 30 9emphasizing that the Due Process Clause sometimes functions to
1prevent a trial from taking place at all rather than to prescribe procedural rules that
govern the conduct of a trial+8.
/2. See Menna v. New York, /23 U.S. 60, 62 909.58 9per curiam) 9holding that the
refusal to speak before a grand jury, after receiving immunity, did not preclude his
Double Jeopardy claim8.
/3. See id. at 63 n.2 9expressing that a guilty plea 1renders irrelevant those
constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual
guilt,+ but in this case, the state has no power to punish the defendant 1no matter how
validly his factual guilt is established+8.
7
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factual guilt and does not inherently authorize the state to criminalize certain
conduct% rather it substantiates conclusions a fact finder may reasonably
draw.// Thus, even following a guilty plea, a conviction is still vulnerable to
attack on the grounds that the state had no power to prosecute the case./5
Commentators have struggled to reconcile the Blackledge and Menna
decisions with other opinions concerning the function of a guilty plea on
subsequent constitutional challenges./6 Many scholars argue that the
distinction between constitutional claims waived by a guilty plea and
constitutional claims not waived lies in whether the constitutional defect
could have been remedied, which would have resulted in a fair trial./.
However, this comment asserts that under Blacklege,Menna, and the Court’s
retroactivity doctrine, the relevant inquiry is not how and when a
constitutional defect can be cured, but whether the state is constitutionally
prohibited from prosecuting a certain case or punishing certain conduct.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Requiring A Guilty Plea to Inherently Waive a Defendant’s Right to
Challenge Her Statute of Conviction Allows the State to Punish Conduct
Constitutionally Beyond Its Reach.
The State has no interest in punishing conduct that is constitutionally
protected./- Allowing statutes that punish protected conduct to go
unchallenged enables states to circumvent the substantive protections
provided by the Constitution in favor of preserving an illegitimate state
interest./9 This potential loophole is especially troubling given the
//. See id. 9asserting that a guilty plea is 1an admission of factual guilt so reliable
that . . . it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case+8.
/5. See id. 9holding that 1a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that . . .
the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute+8.
/6. See Albert Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty
Plea, /. U. COLO. L. REV. 0, 09 909.58 9observing that there is no 1meaningful device
for separating claims that should survive a guilty plea from claims that should not+8.
/.. See, e.g., Augustine v. Cheng, Appellate Review of Double Jeopardy Claims in
the Guilty Plea Context, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 9-3, 990 909--8 9arguing that 1the nature
of the constitutional defect,+ and the state’s ability 1to correct it, is dispositive in
determining whether the defendant will be allowed to raise a given claim+8.
/-. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 036 S. Ct. .0-, .30 924068 9calling such
punishment 1erroneous,+ 1void,+ and 1contrary to law+8% Mackey v. United States, /40
U.S. 6.5, 693 9Harlan, J., dissenting8 9noting the 1obvious interest in freeing individuals
from punishment for conduct that is constitutionally protected+ is significant and
outweighs the state’s interest in finality8.
/9. See, e.g.,Montgomery, 036 S. Ct. at .29-.34 9calling convictions under a statute
8
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prevalence of plea bargains in the criminal justice system.54
A reasonable defendant might plead guilty to a charge simply because
there are no questions of fact for a judge or jury to answer.50 However, a
guilty plea does not imply a concession by the defendant that the state has
the constitutional authority to proscribe the conduct that gave rise to the
charge% rather it is an admission that one did, in fact, engage in the allegedly
prohibited conduct.52 If it is determined upon review that the state has no
authority to punish that conduct, the defendant is essentially innocent of
wrongdoing, regardless of the plea she entered.53
The Court anticipates that its retroactivity doctrine, which supersedes the
state’s finality interest and applies new substantive rules to finalized cases,
will inconveniently result in more litigation and retrials for the state.5/ The
same would certainly be true of the issue in Class, which in allowing
defendants who plead guilty to launch constitutional challenges to their
statutes of conviction will undoubtedly place some burden on the state to
defend its statutes.55
However, the state’s interest in finality is completely irrelevant when the
issue at hand is a matter of substantive due process, such as whether the state
has the power to criminalize certain behavior, and this finality interest must
yield to the defendant’s liberty interest.56 Similarly, the state must undergo
prohibited by the Constitution 1unlawful+8.
54. See generally Brady v. United States, 39. U.S. ./2, .52 909.48 9describing the
ubiquity of plea bargains in American courts and exploring the reasons prosecutors and
some defendants tend to prefer taking a plea bargain to facing trial8.
50. See Menna v. New York, /23 U.S. 60, 62 n.2 909.58 9indicating a guilty plea
sometimes functions as an admission of fact, not law, which removes the need for fact
finding proceedings8% see also Loving v. Virginia, 3-- U.S. 0, 2-/ 9096.8 9noting that the
Lovings pled guilty to violating Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law but never disputed the
fact that they were members of different races as defined by the statute8.
52. See Menna, /23 U.S. at 62 n.2 9reiterating that factual guilt is not sufficient for
a prosecution if the charge is such that 1the State may not convict petitioner no matter
how validly his factual guilt is established+8.
53. See United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, /40 U.S. .05, .26-2. 909.08
9Brennan, J., concurring8 9asserting that 1the government has no . . . interest in punishing
those innocent of wrongdoing+ when defendants are accused of conduct beyond the
state’s power to sanction8.
5/. See id. at .23 9discussing the likelihood that the state 1will be required to undergo
the relatively insignificant inconvenience involved in defending any lawsuits that may
be anticipated+8.
55. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, /40 U.S. 6.5, 690-92 909.08 9Harlan, J.,
dissenting8 9discussing the state’s resources saved by avoiding appeal8.
56. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 036 U.S. .0-, .32 924068 9asserting the
state’s finality interest is insignificant when the state seeks to impose a punishment that
9
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the inconvenience of further litigating and defending appellate challenges to
statute’s constitutionality to ensure that the statute has not criminalized
conduct beyond its reach.5. If on appeal the statute is held to be an
unconstitutional infringement on constitutionally protected conduct, then the
state has no interest in continuing to punish the defendant, regardless of
whether or not she did in fact engage in that conduct.5-
If a state sought to circumvent substantive constitutional protections and
guarantees, a rule allowing guilty pleas to inherently waive a defendant’s
right to challenge her statute of conviction would be ideal. For example, in
Crowley, Louisiana, it is illegal under a local ordinance to wear 1saggy+
pants.59 This ordinance would be vulnerable to a reasonable and well-
founded challenge under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,
meaning it potentially encroaches on protected conduct.64 However, rather
than pleading not guilty to preserve the right to challenge the ordinance on
appeal, a rational defendant who has violated this ordinance may decide to
forgo a trial given the uncertainty of trial proceedings, the weight of the
evidence indicating that he did in fact violate the ordinance, the time and
money that must be invested to procure an attorney, and because there is no
genuine issue of fact the defendant wishes to contest or raise.60
Instead, this defendant may determine that his best option is to accept a
plea offer, which will ensure that the matter is resolved swiftly and with a
lesser penalty than may have been imposed by a fact finder.62 However, the
the Constitution prohibits8.
5.. See U.S. Coin, /40 U.S. at .26 9emphasizing that the state’s interest in avoiding
further litigation must yield to the defendant’s liberty interest when the government has
no power to criminalize the defendant’s conduct in the first place8.
5-. See, e.g., id. at .2. 9holding that in the retroactivity context, the state may not
continue to punish an individual for engaging in conduct that is beyond its reach pursuant
to a new substantive constitutional rule8.
59. See CROWLEY, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. ., art. II, & .-5.9a8 924038 91It
shall be unlawful for any person to wear outer clothing or garments, including but not
limited to trousers, pants, shorts, and5or other outer garments designed to be worn at or
below the waist of the body and in such a manner as to expose a person’s underwear or
undergarments in a public place or in public view+8.
64. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 2-3 U.S. 359, 369-.4 909308 9holding a
prohibition on wearing red pins as a symbol of organized resistance violates the Free
Speech Clause8% Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 543, 545-46
909698 9noting that wearing armbands is akin to *pure speech’, which is afforded
1comprehensive protection under the First Amendment+8.
60. See Brady v. United States, 39. U.S. ./2, .52 909.48 9indicating that accepting
a plea deal offer conveys advantages to the defendant as well as the state8.
62. See, e.g., id. 9noting that plea bargains are valuable to defendants in that they
reduce the defendant’s exposure, allow the correctional process to begin more quickly,
10
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question remains as to whether the state has any cognizable authority to
regulate howmembers of the public wear their pants with a threat of criminal
penalties.63 While the Court has yet to confront this issue directly, and
extend First Amendment protections to the height at which an individual
chooses to wear his pants, denying the defendant an opportunity to present
this question for appellate review and argue its merits is a gross distortion of
the principles of judicial review.6/
Criminalizing potentially protected conduct while preventing defendants
from challenging that conduct’s criminalization violates the notions of
fundamental fairness undergirding in the criminal justice system.65 In this
hypothetical, the state could argue that the defendant still has the possibility
of obtaining relief in the event that another individual is charged with
violating the ordinance, pleads not guilty, is convicted, and challenges the
ordinance’s constitutionality on appeal.66 Setting aside the practical burdens
placed on the defendant who pled guilty, the Court’s retroactivity
jurisprudence was clear that the state had already exceeded its
constitutionally prescribed limits by bringing charges against the defendant
and punishing him for his conduct.6.
Additionally, the state may not anticipate more prosecutions under this
law following the defendant’s conviction because the state simply wanted to
make an example of the defendant to deter future violations of the
ordinance.6- If the defendant’s prosecution in this hypothetical was an effort
and eliminate the practical difficulties associated with trial8.
63. See CROWLEY, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. ., art. II, & .-5.9c8 9prescribing
fines of up to (244 and5or at least sixty days in jail for a defendant’s first violation8.
6/. See Montgomery v. Louisiana 036 S. Ct. .0-, .30 924068 91A penalty imposed
pursuant to an unconstitutional law is no less void because the prisoner’s sentence
became final before the law was held unconstitutional. There is no grandfather clause
that permits States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids. To conclude
otherwise would undercut the Constitution’s substantive guarantees+8.
65. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, /-9 U.S. 2--, 30/ 909-98 9emphasizing the importance
of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system and public confidence in its
fairness8.
66. C.f. Poe v. Ullman, 36. U.S. /9., 532-33 909608 9Harlan, J., dissenting8
9discussing a Connecticut birth control proscription that was only prosecuted once prior
to that instance in an explicit effort by the state to deter violation of the statute8.
6.. SeeDesist v. United States, 39/U.S. 2//, 260 n. 2 909698 9Harlan, J., dissenting8
9explaining that since 1the State had no power to proscribe the conduct for which the
petitioner was imprisoned, it could not constitutionally insist that he remain in jail+8%
Mackey v. United States, /40 U.S. 6.5, 693 909.08 9Harlan, J., dissenting8 9condemning
1permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to
repose+8.
6-. See, e.g., Poe, 36. U.S. at 532-33 9Harlan, J., dissenting8 9providing an example
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to deter further violation of the law, it is unlikely that another case would
create a substantive rule that the defendant could argue should be
retroactively applied to his case so that he could obtain relief on appeal.69
The draconian result of this hypothetical is that this defendant would have
no opportunity for relief despite the fact that the statute of his conviction may
violate the First Amendment and infringe on constitutionally protected
expression..4
The above argument, however, does not suggest that prosecutors would
maliciously take advantage of a rule that allows a guilty plea to preclude a
constitutional challenge on appeal, or would seek to manipulate or coerce a
defendant into pleading guilty in order to trick her into surrendering her
substantive due process rights. On the contrary, sometimes a guilty plea is
the best and most rational choice for both the state and the defendant..0
Defendants could easily resolve cases in which the guilty pleas were
obtained through coercive or deceptive means by arguing the voluntary and
intelligent nature of the plea..2 However, as the Court noted in Blackledge,
the defect in the Defendant’s second charge was not actual vindictiveness on
the part of the prosecutor, but rather was perceived prosecutorial
vindictiveness..3
B. Allowing a Guilty Plea to Prohibit a Defendant from Challenging the
Constitutionality of the Statute of Her Conviction Would Be Akin to a
Judicially-Imposed Arbitrary Infringement on Protected Conduct Barred
by the Due Process Clause.
Another substantive due process theory supporting the conclusion that a
guilty plea does not prohibit a defendant from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute of her conviction is the Court’s arbitrariness
doctrine../ Courts use this doctrine, particularly in the civil realm, to analyze
of a state using sporadic enforcement of a statute as a deterrent8.
69. See id. at 530 9noting that there had been only one prosecution under the
Connecticut statute before the Court8.
.4. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 2-3 U.S. 359, 369-.4 909308 9holding a
prohibition on wearing red buttons as a political symbol violates the Free Speech Clause8.
.0. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 39. U.S. ./2, .52 909.48 9discussing the
advantages of accepting a guilty plea for the defendant and the advantages of obtaining
a guilty plea for the prosecutor8.
.2. See, e.g., id. at ./- 9affirming that pleas must be voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made8.
.3. See Blackledge v. Perry, /0. U.S. 20, 2- 909./8 9stating that defendants need
sufficient protection to be free from the *fear of vindictiveness’8.
./. See generally Poe, 36.U.S. at 5/3 9Harlan, J., dissenting8 9noting that the liberty
12
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Fourteenth Amendment due process claims when a particular government
action pits individual liberty interests against the needs of society..5 In this
context, the needs of society are two-fold: the need for finality in resolving
criminal prosecutions and the needs that prompt the passing of legislation
that potentially infringes on protected conduct.76 However, the individual’s
needs remain unchanged and the relevant question is to what extent the state
infringes upon 1the right to be let alone.+..
When the Court conducts its substantive due process analysis, it asks
whether a state’s interests justify a corresponding infringement upon the
fundamental rights of individuals..- However, an interesting phenomenon
would occur if a guilty plea barred a challenge to the constitutionality of the
statute of her conviction% the guilty plea itself would become an arbitrary
justification for continued infringement upon an individual’s protected
conduct..9 The individual’s punishment under the unconstitutional statute,
be it incarceration, state supervision, a monetary fine, or some combination
of the three, is based on the state’s finality interest and manifested by the
defendant’s guilty plea.-4
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment exists on a 1rational continuum
which . . . includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints+8.
.5. See id. at 5/2% see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 520 U.S. .42, .52 9099.8
9Souter, J., concurring8 9asserting that individuals do not have a fundamental liberty
interest in assisted suicide under the Fourteenth Amendment8%Youngberg v. Romeo, /5.
U.S. 34., 309-2/ 909-28 9holding that involuntarily committed persons have a significant
liberty interest in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints under the Fourteenth
Amendment8% Griswold v. Connecticut, 3-0 U.S. /.9, /99 909658 9Harlan, J.,
concurring8 9agreeing with the majority that married couples have a fundamental liberty
interest in privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment8.
.6. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, /40 U.S. 66., 694 909.08 9Harlan, J.,
dissenting8 9noting that the state’s finality interest is always at play in criminal law8.
... See generallyOlmstead v. United States, 2..U.S. /3-, /.--.9 9092-8 9Brandeis,
J., dissenting8 9writing about the Fourth Amendment, which became a cornerstone for
the right to privacy8.
.-. See, e.g.,Washington, 520 U.S. at .55-56 9Souter, J., dissenting8 9examining the
substantive due process claims made by individuals negatively affected by a statute
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide8.
.9. See generally Poe v. Ullman, 36. U.S. /9., 5/3 909608 9Harlan, J., dissenting8
9noting that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against 1arbitrary impositions+ upon
liberty8.
-4. See, e.g., id. at 5/- 9concluding that the state’s interest in enforcing moral
judgment by criminalizing the use and distribution of contraceptives is insufficient to
justify intruding upon marital privacy8.
13
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Consider the 1saggy pants+ hypothetical.-0 If it reached an appellant court
on the merits, the court would find the ordinance in violation of the First
Amendment because the state has no compelling interest in regulating
citizens’ waistbands.-2 Thus, the state would be prohibited from continuing
to fine, supervise, or incarcerate the defendant who successfully challenged
this ordinance.-3 To allow a guilty plea, which is both the procedural
embodiment of the state’s and defendant’s practical interests in avoiding trial
and a concession of factual guilt, to prevent an appellate court from striking
down such an unconstitutional statute is absurd.-/ A prohibition on claims
with similar merits and procedural postures is akin to an arbitrary imposition
on liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.-5
The Court has previously struck down arbitrary impositions on liberty by the
legislative and executive branches, and it would be illogical to forbid
arbitrary impositions on liberty by the judicial branch.-6
Given that courts analyze substantive due process issues by weighing the
competing interests of the state and the defendant, the Court may examine
this question through the lens of the strict scrutiny test used to determine
when an infringement on a substantive due process right is permissible.-.
Strict scrutiny is a two prong test requiring: 908 that the statute or policy
-0. See CROWLEY, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. ., art. II, & .-5.9a8 924038
9criminalizing wearing saggy pants in public8.
-2. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 2-3 U.S. 359, 369 909308 9holding wearing
red pins as a symbol of political resistance is protected by the Free Speech Clause8% see
also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 306 U.S. 535, 5// 909/28 9noting that
1there are limits to+ a statute’s 1presumption of constitutionality . . . especially where the
liberty of the person is concerned+8.
-3. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 044 U.S. 3.0, 3.6-.. 90-.98 9holding that 1=a<n
unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offence created by it is not a crime. A
conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal
cause of imprisonment+8.
-/. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 39. U.S. ./2, .52 909.48 9noting the practical
benefits of plea bargains to both prosecutors and defendants8% see also Menna v. New
York, /23 U.S. 60, 62 n. 2 909.58 9finding that a guilty plea is merely an admission of
factual guilt rather than a concession by the defendant that the state has the power to
prosecute a particular charge8.
-5. See Poe, 36. U.S. at 5/3 9noting that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause protects against 1arbitrary impositions+ on liberty by the government8.
-6. See, e.g., Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. -33, -/6 9099-8 9first citing Griswold
v. Connecticut, 3-0 U.S. /.9 909658% then citing Rochin v. California, 3/2 U.S. 065
9095288 9observing that substantive due process limits both the legislative and executive
powers of government8.
-.. See generally Poe, 36. U.S. at 5/3 9laying the foundation for the strict scrutiny
test to be applied to substantive due process questions8.
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infringing upon protected conduct be in furtherance of a compelling
government interest, and 928 that the statute or policy be narrowly tailored to
accomplish that compelling interest.-- In Roe v. Wade, the Court applied
strict scrutiny in striking down a law criminalizing abortion.-9 The state
argued that it had a compelling interest in protecting prenatal life.94 The
petitioner, on the other hand, asserted that the law infringed on her right to
privacy.90 The Court held that while the state has a compelling interest in
preserving and protecting life, the lack of consensus among scientists,
religious leaders, and philosophers as to when life begins means that the
interest is not significantly compelling until a person is actually born.92 In
Roe, the competing interests to be weighed were clear: the state’s interest in
protecting life versus the petitioner’s countervailing interest in privacy.
Sensitive to the relationship between the state’s and defendant’s interests,
the Court recognized that as the pregnancy progresses and the fetus’ potential
for life grows, the state’s interest in protecting that potential life also
increases and becomes more compelling.93 The state has an interest, the
Court held, in protecting the life and health of the mother too, and that
interest also fluctuates depending on the point in a pregnancy at which the
abortion is sought.9/ The Court asserted that once a pregnancy reaches the
point that the interest of protecting the life of a child becomes compelling,
the state may regulate abortion practices, but only if the state narrowly tailors
the regulations.95 Thus, the Court created a sliding scale based on the
trimester timeline to illustrate how the state’s interest increases while the
--. See Strict Scrutiny, CORNELLL. SCHOOL, https:55www.law.cornell.edu5wex5strict
_scrutiny 9last visited Dec. 00, 240.8% see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 3-0 U.S. /.9,
/-.--9 909658 9Goldberg, J., concurring8 9noting that some fundamentally protected
rights are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution8.
-9. See Roe v. Wade, /04 U.S. 003, 055 909.38 9specifying that certain fundamental
rights can only be infringed upon when the state satisfies strict scrutiny8.
94. See id. at 056 9describing the state’s interest in protecting prenatal life 1from and
after conception+8.
90. See id. at 024 9discussing petitioner’s asserted right to privacy under the
Fourteenth, Ninth, Fifth, Fourth, and First Amendments8.
92. See id. at 064-60 9detailing the various explanations as to when life begins across
disciplines8.
93. See id. at 062-6/ 9outlining the trimester framework that determines how
compelling the state’s interest is in the fetus’s life at each point in the pregnancy8.
9/. See id. at 063-6/ 9explaining how the states’ interests in the health of the mother
and preserving the child’s life become more conflicted as the pregnancy progresses8.
95. See id. at 063 9allowing the state to set regulations that protect the health of the
mother only during the first trimester, but then permitting the state to set regulations that
preserve the potential life of the fetus after viability8.
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woman’s interests decrease as the pregnancy progresses.96 However, a
spectrum approach such as the trimester framework adopted in Roe would
be inappropriate in this case as the strength of two interests at play do not
change over time.9.
Using the same strict scrutiny framework, the Court has struck down
several statutes, including those that prohibit interracial and same-sex
marriage and those that ban the use of illegal drugs in religious ceremonies.9-
In each of these cases, the Court concluded that the state was infringing on
protected conduct.99 Additionally, the Court found the state either lacked a
compelling interest or failed to narrowly tailor legislation to achieve a
compelling interest.044
However, in addressing the issue in Class, it is not immediately clear
which state interest the Court should examine: the state’s interest in the
finality of a guilty plea or the interest in prohibiting the conduct proscribed
by the underlying statute of conviction.040 Reaching the latter interest
requires the Court to address the merits of the claim, thus the Court would
probably also examine the state’s finality interest. The end result of this
analysis is a familiar equation with the state’s finality interest on one side
and the defendant’s liberty interest on the other.042 The Court emphatically
96. See id. at 063-6/ 9holding Texas’ law on abortion too broad and limiting because
it only allows for abortions to protect the health of the mother and does not distinguish
between different trimesters8.
9.. See Mackey v. United States, /40 U.S. 66., 693 924068 9Harlan, J., dissenting8
9implying that the time between the conviction and the appeal do not typically affect the
weight of the defendant’s or state’s interests8.
9-. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 035 S. Ct. 25-/, 264- 924058 9striking down a statute
that prohibited recognition of same-sex marriages performed in another state8% Gonzales
v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 5/6 U.S. /0-, /39 924468 9finding
constitutional grounds to preclude criminalization of the ceremonial use of controlled
substances8.
99. See Obergefell, 035 S. Ct. at 264- 9holding that refusing to recognize same-sex
marriages infringed upon the right to marry8% Gonzales, 5/6 U.S. at /39 9holding that
applying drug laws to religious sects infringed upon the right to engage in certain
religious ceremonies8.
044. See Obergefell, 035 S. Ct. at 264- 9concluding the state has no compelling
interest in refusing to recognize same-sex marriage8% Gonzales, 5/6 U.S. at /39 9holding
the state has no compelling interest in criminalizing the sacramental use of controlled
substances8.
040. Compare Obergefell, 035 S. Ct. at 264- 9examining the state’s interest in
prohibiting same-sex marriages8 with Mackey, /40 U.S. at 693 9Harlan, J., dissenting8
9weighing the state’s interest in finality against the defendant’s liberty interests8.
042. See, e.g., Mackey, /40 U.S. at 693 9balancing the state’s interest in finality and
the defendant’s interest in being free from punishment using the retroactivity doctrine8%
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declined to hold a state’s finality interest sufficiently compelling when
compared to a defendant’s liberty interest in the retroactivity context, which
means the state’s encroachment on protected conduct would likely fail strict
scrutiny.043
C. The Ambiguity of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 Prevents a
Guilty Plea from Waiving the Defendant’s Right to Challenge the Statute of
Her Conviction on Appeal.
The Court defines the waiver of a right as the deliberate surrender 1of a
known right or privilege.+04/ Generally, waivers arise in the context of
procedural due process rights, not substantive ones.045 In determining
whether the waiver was valid, the Court evaluates whether the waiver was
made intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.046 However, these waivers
only apply to rights affecting the integrity of the fact-finding process and are
irrelevant to the state’s power to prosecute.04.
The Court has repeatedly held that procedural due process rights can be
waived.04- In several procedural rights cases, the Court discourages
presuming the waiver of constitutional rights.049 Similarly, the Court has
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 036 S. Ct. .0-, .30 924068 9noting that when retroactively
applying substantive rules, the state’s finality interest yields to the defendant’s liberty
interest8.
043. See, e.g., Mackey, /40 U.S. at 693 9Harlan, J., dissenting8 9stressing that the
defendant’s liberty interest outweighs the state’s finality interest when retroactively
applying new substantive rules to old cases8.
04/. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 34/ U.S. /5-, /6/ 9093-8 9discussing the waiver of the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment8.
045. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, /00 U.S. 25-, 259 909.38 9holding that defendant
waived his Fourteenth Amendment right to be indicted by a constitutionally selected
grand jury8% Edwards v. Arizona, /50 U.S. /.., /-5 909-08 9defining how an accused
individual can waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent8.
046. See, e.g., Johnson, 34/ U.S. at /65 9asserting that the trial judge must determine
whether the defendant’s waiver is 1intelligent and competent+8% Brady v. United States,
39. U.S. ./2, ./- 909.48 9affirming that waivers of constitutional rights must be
voluntary, 1knowing =and< intelligent . . . with sufficient awareness of the . . . =probable<
consequences+8.
04.. See Estelle v. Williams, /25 U.S. 540, 52/ 909.68 9discussing waivers 1with
respect to constitutional rights affecting the fairness and accuracy of the factfinding
process+8.
04-. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, //0 U.S. 369, 3.0-.2 909.98 9discussing the
ways a defendant waived his rights to counsel and to remain silent, which are explained
in the Miranda warning8.
049. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 340 U.S. 3-9, 393 9093.8 9urging 1every
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declined to presume the acceptance by litigants of the loss of 1fundamental+
rights.004 However, the Court has not extended the defendant’s ability to
waive constitutional protections to cover the waiver of substantive rights
because doing so would allow the defendant to empower the government to
bypass constitutional limitations on what conduct the government may
proscribe.000
Allowing a guilty plea to function as a waiver of substantive due process
rights presents two significant problems. First, the contours of a particular
substantive right may not be known at the time of a plea and might only be
determined through the appeals process.002 For example, in the 1saggy
pants+ hypothetical, there may be a substantive right to free expression via
one’s clothing that the Court has yet to pronounce and precisely define, and
one may reasonably predict that an appellate court would hold that such right
exists.003
However, until the issue reaches the appellate level, it may be unclear to
the prosecutor, judge, defendant, and even the legislature exactly what shape
that right will ultimately take, thus the right is to some degree unknown.00/
But a defendant can only waive known rights announced by the Court.005
Therefore, only procedural rights can be waived, because the contours of the
right to a jury trial or the right to counsel, for example, are much more
straight-forward, well-established, and easier to define than the substantive
reasonable presumption+ against the waiver of the right to a jury trial8% see also Hodges
v. Easton, 046 U.S. /4-, /02 90--28 9holding that all reasonable presumptions against
the waiver of the right to a jury trial should be exhausted before presuming the waiver of
this right8.
004. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 340 U.S. 292, 34. 9093.8
9indicating that 1acquiescence =to< the loss of fundamental =property< rights+ should not
be presumed8.
000. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, /62 U.S. 0439, 04// 909-38 9discussing only a
defendant’s waiver of procedural protections, such as the right to counsel and the right
to remain silent8.
002. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 520 U.S. .42, .65-.66 9099.8 9discussing
the building of substantive due process rights through judicial jurisprudence8.
003. See CROWLEY, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. ., art. II, & .-5.9a8 924038
9criminalizing wearing 1saggy+ pants, potentially in violation of the First Amendment’s
substantive protections8.
00/. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 520 U.S. at .22 9noting the difficulty of defining
substantive due process rights and commenting that those rights are 1perhaps incapable
of being fully clarified+8.
005. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 34/ U.S. /5-, /6/ 9093-8 9defining a waiver as 1an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege+8.
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rights upon which the government cannot legally infringe.006
The second problem is that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
governing pleas, Rule 00, does not clearly state that the defendant waives the
right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of her conviction upon
appeal.00. This rule states that, prior to accepting a defendant’s guilty plea,
the court must directly address the defendant in court to ensure that the plea
is voluntary and inform her of the various trial rights she has, including the
right to a jury trial, the right to counsel, and the right to confront adverse
witnesses.00- The court must then inform the defendant that by pleading
guilty she waives the trial rights explicitly mentioned in Rule 00.009 The
court must also inform the defendant of any conditions of the plea resulting
in a waiver of the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence
imposed.024 The rule’s text is unclear as to which appellate rights the plea
agreement waives.020
This text may refer to the provision of Rule 00 allowing defendants to
1reserve=e< . . . the right to have an appellate court review an adverse ruling
of a =specific< pretrial motion+ while simultaneously pleading guilty.022
These motions include those alleging defects in the indictment, motions to
suppress evidence, motions alleging defects in instituting the prosecution,
motions to severe, and discovery motions.023 However, this reservation only
refers to the right to appeal certain pretrial motions, and not to the right to
appeal the constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant was
006. See Poe v. Ullman, 36. U.S. /9., 5/3 909608 9Harlan, J., dissenting8 9noting that
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause 1has not been
reduced to any formula% its content cannot be determined by reference to any code+8.
00.. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009b8908 9listing the factors the court must inform the
defendant of before she accepts her guilty plea, including the appellate rights she waives8.
00-. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009b89089A8-9O8 9listing the right not to plead guilty, the
right to be protected from compelled self-incrimination and the right to present evidence
and compel the attendance of witnesses, as well as other rights the defendant enjoys8.
009. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009b8908 9noting that a nolo contendere plea also functions
as a waiver of these trial rights8.
024. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009a8928 9referencing the terms of a plea agreement
provision to which the defendant agreed and signed8.
020. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 009b89089N8 9referring to the defendant’s waiver of
her right to appeal her sentence that may be placed in some plea agreements8 with FED.
R. CRIM. P. 009a8928 9mentioning only that the defendant can reserve certain appellate
rights8.
022. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009a8928 9requiring 1the consent of the court+ in reserving
this right8.
023. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 029b89389A8-9E8 9listing the various types of defenses that
must be asserted by motions prior to trial8.
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charged.02/ The text does not mention the right of the defendant to reserve
the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on appeal.025
Another possible meaning of this cryptic provision is that appellate rights
under the statute only include post-conviction challenges to the defendant’s
sentence, but not the constitutionality of the statute of conviction.026 Because
Rule 00 does not require the trial court to explicitly tell the defendant that
she is waiving the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute by
pleading guilty, the plea cannot possibly be intelligently made for the
purposes of waiving that right.02. Rights waived must, by definition, be
waived intentionally.02- Because the court does not explicitly inform a
defendant that her plea will prohibit her from raising a constitutional
challenge to the statute of her conviction on appeal, she has not intentionally
relinquished or waived that appellate right% rather, she has only relinquished
appellate rights that she has been informed of by the court.029
There is one potential safe harbor for a defendant wishing to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute that indicted her while also avoiding trial: a
pretrial motion to dismiss for the indictment’s failure to state an offense.034
Because a defendant is permitted appellate review of certain pretrial motions,
notwithstanding a guilty plea, such a motion could possibly get her
constitutional challenge before an appellate court even after she pleads guilty
to the indictment.030 However, courts evaluate motions alleging the failure
to state a criminal offense based on whether there is a defect in the indictment
02/. See id. 9failing to mention the defendant’s rights to challenge the constitutionality
of an underlying statute8.
025. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 00 9a8928 9allowing for appellate review of adverse
determinations of certain pretrial motions8.
026. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009b89089N8 9requiring courts to inform defendants of 1the
terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack
the sentence+8.
02.. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 39. U.S. ./2, ./- 909.48 9reiterating that pleas
must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made8.
02-. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 34/ U.S. /5-, /6/ 9093-8 9defining waivers as 1an
intentional relinquishment+ of rights8.
029. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009b8908 9including the various trial rights that are rendered
irrelevant in the absence of a trial and the right to appeal the sentence in certain
circumstances8.
034. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 029b89389B89v8 9listing a defective indictment, for failure to
state an offense, as a motion that must be made before trial8.
030. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009a8928% FED. R. CRIM. P. 029b89389B89v8 9allowing
conditional guilty pleas in which the defendant 1reserve=es< the right to have an appellate
court review =< adverse determination=s< of . . . =certain< pretrial motions+, such as a
motion alleging a 1failure to state =a criminal< offense+ in the indictment8.
20
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol26/iss1/3
240.< RETHINKING THE EFFECTS OF AGUILTY PLEA 6/3
or information, rather than whether there is a constitutional defect in the
statute that led to the defendant’s indictment and conviction.032
When an appellate court examines a pretrial motion alleging a failure to
state a criminal offense, the relevant inquiry is not based on whether the
government had the power to criminalize the defendant’s conduct, but
whether the factual allegations contained in the indictment constitute an
offense as defined under the relevant statute.033 If the factual allegations do
constitute an offense, then the indictment is valid and the trial court is
deemed to have denied the motion appropriately.03/ As in Menna, the
defendant’s contention would not be that she did not perform the acts that
constitute a statutory crime, but that the state had no authority to prosecute
her for performing such acts.035
Thus, the defendant who wants to avoid the practical burdens of trial while
asserting that the state infringed upon protected conduct has no viable
procedural options.036 This defendant must either plead guilty and forfeit her
right to challenge this infringement, or face an unnecessary prosecution that
the state has no power to initiate.
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The resolution of Class v. United States is likely to have a tremendous
impact on our plea-reliant criminal justice system.03. Prosecutors often use
the threat of more serious charges and longer sentences to pressure
defendants into pleading guilty to a lesser charge.03- Indigent defendants are
032. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 36. F.3d 09/, 09. 9/th Cir. 244/8 9examining
a pretrial motion alleging a failure to state an offense in an indictment for driving while
intoxicated8.
033. See id. 9explaining the limited scope of the appellate court’s review of the
indictment8.
03/. See, e.g., id. 9noting that courts are to examine the factual basis of the indictment
and plea, and determine whether those facts satisfy the elements of a crime based on the
statute8.
035. SeeMenna v. New York, /23 U.S. 60, 62 n.2 909.58 9expounding 1the claim . . .
that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt is
established+8.
036. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 009a8928 9providing a procedure for a defendant who
wishes to challenge an adverse pretrial ruling, but not a defendant who wishes to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which she is charged8.
03.. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 056, 0.4 924028 9citing Missouri v. Frye, 566
U.S. 033 9240288 9noting that 1=n<inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-
four percent of state convictions . . . result =from< guilty pleas88.
03-. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 000., 002- 924008 9discussing the
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more susceptible to the intense pressure to accept a plea deal, and thus have
higher rates of guilty pleas than other defendants.039 Consider the case of
Shanta Sweatt, an indigent defendant from Nashville, Tennessee.0/4 Facing
a felony conviction and a prison sentence ranging from two to twelve years
after police found a small amount of marijuana in her home, Ms. Sweatt pled
guilty to a misdemeanor possession charge and received a six-month
suspended sentence, no probation, and a total of (0,396.05 in fines and
fees.0/0
Ms. Sweatt maintains that the drugs belonged to her boyfriend, but she
was willing to accept the plea offer to significantly reduce her and her
family’s exposure.0/2 Given the growing political support for legalizing
marijuana and the potentially severe consequences of a possession charge,
Ms. Sweatt hypothetically could have argued on appeal that criminalizing
the possession of marijuana or imposing such severe sentences for
possession is unconstitutional.0/3 However, Ms. Sweatt must now live with
a misdemeanor conviction and pay a sizable fine for making the rational
choice to limit her exposure, without the opportunity to assert her rights in
an appellate court.0//
While the drug possession charge may be resolved, Ms. Sweatt now joins
many other Americans who face long-term consequences for criminal
convictions, including significant barriers to gainful and lawful
broad discretion of prosecutors to pursue inflated charges with severe sentences in order
to secure a plea8.
039. See Brief of Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, at 9-04, Class v. United States, 9240.8 9No. 06-/2/8 9describing the imbalance
of bargaining power between indigent defendants and prosecutors8.
0/4. See Emily Yoffe, Innocence is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 9Sep. 240.8,
https:55www.theatlantic.com5magazine5archive5240.5495innocence-is-irrelevant553/0.0
9examining the troubling state of plea bargaining and innocence in the criminal justice
system8.
0/0. See id. 9describing Sweatt’s alleged crime and the plea offer she accepted to
avoid trial8.
0/2. See id. 9detailing Sweatt’s fear that her son would be charged for the marijuana
if she denied that it belonged to her8.
0/3. See, e.g., Julia Marsh, Ex-Jets Player Sues Jeff Sessions to Legalize Marijuana,
N.Y. POST 9July 2/, 240.8, http:55nypost.com5240.54.52/5ex-jets-player-sues-jeff-
sessions-to-legalize-marijuana5 9describing a recent civil suit that challenges the
constitutionality of marijuana’s Schedule I classification under the Controlled
Substances Act on substantive due process grounds8.
0//. See Emily Yoffe, supra note 0/4 9noting that Sweatt’s guilty plea likely
waived her right to appeal8.
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employment.0/5 Given the pervasiveness of plea bargaining, most of these
convictions were undoubtedly secured via the plea-bargaining process.0/6
Given the prevalence of plea bargaining in the criminal justice system, the
unequal bargaining power between defendants and prosecutors, and the
serious consequences of accepting a plea to avoid the uncertainty of trial, a
guilty plea should not waive a defendant’s right to challenge the
constitutionality of her statute of conviction.0/. In lieu of a holding that a
guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s right to challenge the
constitutionality of her statute of conviction, Congress should amend Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 00 to clarify precisely which rights are being
waived.0/- Specifically, Congress should amend Rule 009e8, which governs
the finality of guilty pleas, to include the following clause: 1However, the
plea may be rendered invalid if the defendant successfully exercises her right
to appeal the constitutionality of the statute of her conviction.+0/9
Additionally, Congress should eliminate Rule 009b89089N8, which requires
the judge to inform the defendant of the terms of the plea agreement that
waive appellate rights, as this provision would be rendered irrelevant by the
proposed changes to Rule 009e8.054
V. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court decides Class v. United States in October Term
240., there will have several grounds to hold that a guilty plea does not
inherently waive a defendant’s right to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute of her conviction.050 The Court can use the guidance of Justice
Harlan’s retroactivity doctrine to determine that the state’s interest in finality
0/5. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., NAT’L EMPL’T LAW PROJECT, 65
MILLION 1NEED NOT APPLY+: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 3 924008 9estimating that over sixty-five million American
adults face limited employment opportunities due to a criminal conviction8.
0/6. See Brief of Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, at 6-., Class v. United States, 9240.8 9No. 06-/2/8 9noting the statistical
significance of cases resolved using plea bargains8.
0/.. See generally id. at 5 9explaining the practical necessity of allowing appellate
rights to survive a guilty plea8.
0/-. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009b8908 9listing the waived rights that the court must inform
the defendant of before she accepts the plea deal8.
0/9. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009e8 9allowing for a 1plea to be set aside only on direct
appeal or collateral attack for involuntariness+8.
054. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 009b89089N8 9requiring the judge to inform the defendant of
any waivers of appellate rights contained in the plea agreement8.
050. See supra Part III 9arguing that a guilty plea should not waive a defendant’s right
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of her conviction on appeal8.
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is vastly outweighed by the defendant’s liberty interest in engaging in
protected behavior without government interference.052 The Court could
take a more traditional substantive due process approach and hold that
allowing a guilty plea to prevent the defendant from challenging state
infringement on protected conduct would be an arbitrary imposition on a
right protected by the Due Process Clause.053 Additionally, the Court could
examine Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 00 and determine that the
ambiguous text and the presumption against waivers of fundamental rights
indicates that guilty pleas should not result in a waiver of substantive due
process rights that can be asserted on appeal.05/ Regardless of which
framework the Court uses to analyze the question presented in Class, the
most logical holding would be that a guilty plea does not inherently waive a
defendant’s right to challenge the statute of her conviction on appeal.055
052. See supra Part III9A8 9drawing parallels between the Court’s retroactivity
doctrine and the issue in Class8.
053. See supra Part III9B8 9arguing that the Court’s substantive due process doctrine
provides a basis for holding that a guilty plea does not inherently waive a defendant’s
right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of her conviction on appeal8.
05/. See supra Part III9C8 9examining the text of the federal rule governing pleas,
noting its ambiguity and its unfavorable presumption of a waiver of appellate rights8.
055. See supra Part III 9providing three possible grounds on which the Court may hold
that a guilty plea does not inherently waive a defendant’s right to challenge the
constitutionality of her statute of conviction on appeal8.
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